WHO will fund it? Which countries will troops come from? How will it coordinate with the police and other actors? What role will Erik Prince’s private drone fleet play? These are just some of the questions facing Haiti’s new Gang Suppression Force (GSF).
After the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission failed to stem Haiti’s rapidly deteriorating security situation, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 2793 on 30 September to replace the MSS with a new force.
By Daniela Mohor
Slated to eventually number 5,500 police and military officers, the GSF officially started operating two weeks later, but for the time being, it is reliant on the contingent of around 1,000 MSS personnel deployed last year.
Authorised by the UN, the MSS was mandated to help the Haitian National Police (PNH) restore security two years after the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse sent the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, spiralling downwards into new levels of lawlessness. The US pledged to provide $600 million for the mission, but this wasn’t enough, and other countries didn’t follow through on commitments of money and personnel.
“The MSS was never given the means to carry out its mandate. It was supposed to have up to 2,500 personnel; it got barely to 1,000. They didn’t have the necessary equipment; they were outgunned and underfunded,” a Caribbean diplomatic source told The New Humanitarian, speaking on condition of anonymity. “We can only hope that the GSF will get the funding and the number of personnel that have been mentioned in the Security Council Resolution.”
A statement posted on the new force’s X account says the transformation of the MSS into the GSF “reflects the lessons learned from the MSS mission”, and adds that the GSF “operates under a more robust mandate”.
But experts both inside and outside of Haiti say more information is needed to know what changes the GSF can really bring about, and many fear it will fall foul of the same obstacles that caused the original mission to fail or, worse, inflame the situation.
This briefing explores what we know about the new force, the challenges ahead, and what it all means for Haitians struggling through one of the world’s gravest humanitarian crises.
What is the current situation in Haiti?
Since the deployment of the Kenya-led force, the security situation has continued to worsen: At least 4,388 people were killed due to gang violence between January and September this year, according to the latest quarterly report from BINUH, the UN’s office in Haiti. Armed groups have continued to expand to larger areas of the country; nearly 1.4 million people are now displaced, and more than half of the population of nearly 12 million faces acute food insecurity.
In early October, Stéphane Dujarric, the spokesperson for the UN secretary-general, told the press that 6,450 cases of gender-based violence had been registered between January and August of this year – half of them rapes. In 75% of cases, gangs were the perpetrators, and displaced people made up 70% of the survivors.
Compounding the situation, humanitarian assistance is struggling to reach those in need, as aid barriers grow insurmountable.
“Working conditions are becoming increasingly difficult, especially with the fear that has taken hold in the humanitarian sector since a gang kidnapped UNICEF workers [in July]”, Jean-Marc Biquet, head of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Haiti, where the organisation has been repeatedly targeted, told The New Humanitarian. “Everyone is reluctant to travel to dangerous areas,” he added.
So what do we know about the new Gang Suppression Force?
Like the MSS, the GSF is not a standard UN peacekeeping mission, but a UN-authorised force mandated to operate in consultation with the Haitian government. However, it is different from the original force in several ways.
The GSF will rely on operational and logistical support from a United Nations Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH), still to be set up in Port-au-Prince – a backing the original force did not have. The UNSOH will provide fuel, water, accommodation, and other necessary infrastructure for the GSF bases, as well as medical and mobility support.
Set to be much larger than the MSS, which was composed mostly of police officers and whose mandate was to support the PNH in its operations, this new mission will be largely military and is allowed to operate independently of PNH command.
In a press conference days before the resolution’s approval, Henry Wooster, chargé d’affaires at the US embassy in Haiti, said the mandate enjoins the GSF “to go after the gangs, to pursue them with lethal force”, adding that the new force will have “freedom of manoeuvre”.
According to Resolution 2793, its initial 12-month mandate includes “intelligence-led targeted, counter-gang operations to neutralise, isolate, and deter gangs”, but also “provid[ing] security for critical infrastructure sites and transit locations”, and supporting the PNH, the Haitian Armed Forces, and national institutions to ensure the security conditions needed to hold elections and allow access to humanitarian aid.
The mission’s leadership and accountability system are also different to those of the MSS. According to Resolution 2793, the GSF will include – in addition to the 5,500 troop contingent – 50 civilians to whom those troops will report. No information about the nationalities or the distinct roles of those civilians has been shared.
Unlike the MSS, which had to find a country willing to lead it, the strategic direction and oversight of the new force will fall to a Standing Group of Partners, including the nations that contributed to the previous mission – the US, Canada, Kenya, The Bahamas, Jamaica, Guatemala, and El Salvador. On 1 December, the group designated Jack Christofides, a senior UN official with previous experience leading peacekeeping efforts in Africa and Lebanon, as the force’s Special Representative.
The Organisation of American States (OAS) will play a specific role too. In August, the hemisphere-wide regional bloc presented a “Road Map for Stability and Peace in Haiti” – a plan to be led by Haitian authorities with international support and coordinated by the OAS, CARICOM (the Caribbean regional bloc), and the UN.
“The OAS has been asked to contribute to the overall strategic concept of the GSF,” OAS Secretary Albert Ramdin told The New Humanitarian via email. “[It] has been given a mandate to provide “to provide a targeted support package to the GSF and HNP (Haitian National Police)”, including food and water, fuel, transports, tents, defence supplies, and appropriate communication equipment.
Who will fund the force?
Although the GSF will rely partly on UN funding through the UNSOH, it won’t be enough to ensure the required money and troops, which may delay its deployment until after 7 February 2026, when the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council (CPT) – established in April 2024 to govern the country till new elections could be held – is due to end.
“It’s a hybrid model,” William O’Neill, the UN’s independent expert on human rights in Haiti, told The New Humanitarian. “There will be some funding from the UN budget, but the majority of the money will still be coming from voluntary contributions. That raises three big questions: Where is the money going to come from? Where are the people going to come from? And how long will it take?”
The US administration, which pushed for both the previous mission and this one, has stated that it has already spent a billion dollars on supporting security in Haiti and refuses to continue bearing the brunt of the force’s costs.
Of the money the United States provided, $835 million corresponds to necessities such as logistics, meals, accommodation, medical care, and vehicle maintenance, while the rest was for subsidiary and support costs, according to Wooster.
The trust fund established by the UN to gather contributions has received only $113 million, more than half from Canada and $15 million from the US – much less than the $600-800 million per year needed to finance the previous force, let alone one expected to be five times larger. So far, the UN Peace & Security Data Hub reflects no new donations to the Haiti trust fund.
On 1 October, the European Union welcomed the new resolution and announced it was contributing 10 million euros to the force. And three days before the resolution was approved, Canada had pledged about $43 million to support stability in Haiti, some $28.5 million of which was destined for the force.
In mid-November, Laurent Saint-Cyr, the president of the Transitional Presidential Council, announced that Qatar had pledged $44 million to support security and peace recovery, part of which would go to the GSF. But a Haitian security expert knowledgeable about state affairs, who asked not to be identified, said it was no more than “a pledge”.
“There is nothing concrete. No agreement has been signed, and Qatar didn’t make a statement, only Haitians,” the source told The New Humanitarian. “Of the $44 million announced, the government of Qatar will only provide $10 million directly, not all of which is going to the GSF.”
According to several sources, most of the pressure from the UN and the US is being put on Latin American countries to contribute. Ramdin confirmed that the OAS has been asked ”to mobilise support within its member states for funding for the GSF as well as via the provision of government and security personnel”.
“For some, that may mean financial contributions, for others, technical expertise, training, equipment, or logistical support,” Ramdin said. “Some OAS member states have already expressed interest in supporting Haiti with military personnel,” he added, providing no specifics.
What about troops?
Troops are another source of uncertainty. A fact sheet made public in early November indicated that “major elements of the new GSF will arrive in the summer of 2026”, with no mention of which countries would provide boots on the ground.
“We are in the transition phase, which is necessary to ensure the continuity of security operations while other countries prepare to deploy more troops,” Jack Ombaka, the spokesperson for the GSF, told The New Humanitarian.
One criticism likely to come the way of the GSF is that it isn’t so much a new force as simply a rebranding of the MSS.
However, Godfrey Otunge, the Kenyan police officer who led the MSS and is the acting GSF force commander, underscored in a press release that the transition of the MSS into the GSF, “was not a cosmetic shift or a change in name” and that “Haiti’s security posture has fundamentally changed”.
The complex security situation in Port-au-Prince is certainly not improving. In late November, Sunrise Airlines suspended all flights to and from the capital, while the National Port Authority issued a maximum alert due to multiple attacks on Port-au-Prince port facilities.
And the insecurity isn’t restricted to the capital. During the weekend of 29-30 November alone, at least a dozen people were killed in Artibonite – a central region considered the breadbasket of Haiti, half of which is now controlled by gangs. Hundreds were also forced to flee as their houses were set on fire.
This partly explains why several countries won’t contribute security personnel.
In Panama, which co-sponsored the UN Security Council resolution, President José Raúl Mulino told a press conference days after the vote that he had offered to train Haitian police officers but wouldn’t “send soldiers to Haiti to die there, because that is most likely what will happen”.
The United States, which refused to send security personnel when the MSS was deployed, has expressed no intention to change its position. According to some experts, this is also deterring others from pitching in.
“We will find ourselves in the same situation as before if the US doesn’t provide the largest contingent of troops,” Colonel Himmler Rébu, former commander of the Haitian Army’s special forces, told The New Humanitarian. “They are the ones who have the means to do it on the human, logistical and financial levels.”
The New Humanitarian reached out to the US State Department for comment on several occasions but received no response to its questions.
So far, the only nation publicly expressing interest in sending soldiers to Haiti is Rwanda, and consultations are reportedly continuing ahead of a potential deployment.
A “force generation” meeting is scheduled for 9 December at the UN Canada mission in New York to get a sense of the countries willing to provide personnel.
The lack of clarity around fundamental aspects of the GSF remains a key barrier to participation.
On 2 December, Devex, which had access to the force’s concept of operations (CONOPS) draft, reported that potential contributors are hesitant due to its highly belligerent language and legal ambiguity, even as the US continues to order controversial lethal strikes on alleged drug-smuggling boats in the Caribbean.
According to the Haitian security expert, the increasing use of drones to combat the gangs is also a disincentive.
“Countries can’t commit based on a resolution alone,” he said. “And I’m not sure they will be very inclined to deploy troops, knowing that a private military company is also intervening on the ground. It only reinforces reluctancies.”
Why are drones a major concern?
In March, the Haitian government created a special task force to launch a drone campaign targeting gang leaders. For that purpose, it struck a deal with former US Navy SEAL and President Donald Trump ally Erik Prince – a controversial figure known for founding American private military company Blackwater, whose guards were found guilty of a 2007 massacre in Iraq.
In an interview in August, Prince said there was a 10-year agreement between the Haitian government and his firm, Vectus Globa,l to fight gangs and help collect taxes. But Haitian Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé and other Transitional Presidential Council members have been secretive about the exact role that Vectus Global is playing.
“My concern is that civilians will get hurt, that innocent people will die, because usually when Haiti or any Black country is in the crosshairs of police or military, there tends to be less care about collateral damage,” said Wolf Pamphile, founder and executive director of the US-based think tank Haiti Policy House.
This is, in fact, already happening: Prince’s deadly drone operations have killed at least 32 civilians, including several children, this year.
When The New Humanitarian asked Ombaka, the spokesperson for the GSF, whether the force was working with Vectus Global, he said it wasn’t. But several other sources drew a clear association between the two entities.
“The Haitian Police don’t operate attack drones, only the task force, which are the mercenaries,” said Louis Henri Mars, founding member and former executive director of Lakou Lapè, a peacebuilding organisation in Port-au-Prince. “I fear that with the GSF, much more sophisticated drones will be used, with the potential of causing much more collateral damage as their use is increased.”
According to the Haitian security expert, the government has purposely avoided mentioning the name of Vectus Global, fearful of the political fallout of its presence in a country where a president – Moïse – was recently killed by mercenaries. He said the task force “includes military, police, and people from Vectus Global”.
“When there are operations on the ground, the government speaks of the task force, so Vectus Global never appears on paper. That will allow them to say that the GSF is acting with the ‘task force’ without ever mentioning Vectus Global,” he added.
The use of drones worries humanitarians, too.
Biquet, from MSF, said drones are “increasingly used in civilian areas” of Port-au-Prince. “It makes us fear that there are no rules anymore, that the minimal respect for civilians, be it citizens, humanitarian workers, or hospitals, no longer exists]. The danger is rising,” he said.
Losing hearts and minds?
As the country falls into the hands of gangs, some Haitians feel disheartened and disappointed.
After witnessing the MSS fail, Jezirap, a musician in Port-au-Prince, told The New Humanitarian that Haitians have lost all hope that foreign forces will improve the situation.
“Since always, those who say they come to help don’t like us. They make things worse and exploit us more, as they have done since colonial times,” he said. “Even if things get better, it will be difficult because the people who created this situation have an ulterior motive. They created this system, this poverty, this insecurity – to get rich. And the rest of us, we merely endure the result.”
Mars, the former leader of a local peacebuilding organisation, was more optimistic. If things are done well, he said, the deployment of the GSF could yield some important results – from the dismantling and demobilisation of gangs to a decrease in kidnapping, to an economic recovery, to even the possibility of holding elections and reforming Haiti’s governance.
“It could also be an opportunity to make ‘justice’ and give hope to the population that their ordeal is over; it could lead to the emergence of a new class of modern entrepreneurs who are aware of their duties and responsibilities towards the population,” he added.
Will the GSF lead to more violence?
In the short term, however, scepticism prevails, and even those who are in favour of an intervention acknowledge the dangers.
“You have this whole mosaic of violent people using lethal force: the Haitian National Police, this new force, the gangs, the self-defence groups, and then the private military and their drones and snipers. That makes it even more volatile; it’s not predictable at all,” warned O’Neill.
According to the latest BINUH report, more than 60% of gang-related casualties between June and September came during security operations.
One particularly sensitive issue is the higher risk of casualties among Haiti’s youth, given how many of them are now forced to join gangs for survival or under coercion. According to UNICEF, minors now make up around half of all gang members.
“The victims are always in the poor neighbourhoods, where gangs are embedded in the community. So when you attack them, you also attack the community.”
An October report published by the National Human Rights Defence Network in Haiti (RNDDH) registered more than 200 gang members killed and over 150 wounded in drone operations since March.
“While notorious gang leaders remain completely unaffected by these kamikaze drone strikes, their footsoldiers, mostly minors and young adults, are being killed in large numbers,” the document reads.
Resolution 2793 stipulates a strict adherence to all international laws and child protection measures, but some remain unconvinced.
“You can have something on the books, but the question is whether it is actually properly implemented,” said Pamphile. “If the GSF has an opportunity to take out Barbecue (Jimmy Chérizier, the leader of the gang coalition Viv Ansanm), for instance, but there are three kids nearby, what will they do? What is the limit?”
If a high number of civilians – and especially children and teenagers – are killed in security operations, the fear is that large sections of the Haitian population could rise up against the GSF, and this situation could then play into the favour of the gangs instead of effectively combating them.
“If, in their operations, they start killing innocent people, and on top of that they kill 14- or 16-year-olds, it will be ammo for gang members to create this rally call, saying that ‘the imperialists are killing innocent people’. This will discredit the GSF,” said Pamphile.
The use of drones, Mars suggested, could further intensify the violence, especially as they are typically deployed in lower-income areas.
“The victims are always in the poor neighbourhoods, where gangs are embedded in the community. So when you attack them, you also attack the community,” he said. “At some point, resentment will explode, not only against those who killed children and families, but also against those who are perceived as being spared and being the ones who sent the force to kill them.”
What next, and when do Haitians get their say?
The approval of the GSF has been part of wider efforts by the OAS, CARICOM, and the UN to try to ensure a peaceful transition towards new elections and greater stability after the end of the Transitional Presidential Council’s mandate on 7 February 2026.
On 1 December, the CPT approved an electoral decree paving the way for elections to be held in late August and December 2026, and negotiations are still underway to define who will lead the country from February until those elections.
The OAS roadmap envisions support for obtaining political consensus and improving governance, for the electoral process, for humanitarian response, and for the strengthening of sustainable development.
The Caribbean diplomatic source pointed out that this joint work will require a greater level of coordination “to make sure everybody is on the same page”.
But does this “everybody” include Haitians, especially those losing their lives and livelihoods?
“There is a tendency not to take into consideration the advice of locals in the [affected] neighbourhoods,” said Mars. “Many documents are drafted, but no one reads them. It is as if [foreigners] come with a preconceived plan. They don’t speak of the Haitian government and Haitians as central partners in this intervention.”
Mars worries that – as was the case in previous foreign intervention missions – the GSF stakeholders didn’t take the time to consult Haitian civil society, the police, or the Haitian Armed Forces to establish a longer-term strategy that might work.
“This is not only a military matter, it is also a matter of political structure, of mentality, of political personnel, and of internal dialogue among Haitians about the use of armed people to control neighbourhoods and votes,” he said.
Rébu, the former Haitian special forces commander, believes the latest intervention is ill-conceived because it is based on bringing a large amount of security personnel from abroad to fight gangs in the streets, instead of training Haitian forces to help them regain control of the territory, and, more fundamentally, ensuring that the societal root causes of the crisis are addressed.
“The true problem in Haiti is the construction of poverty, the lack of investment in employment and access to education, healthcare, etc.,” he said. “It is this poverty that must be dismantled, and this requires a much more humane, logical, and patient form of governance.”
With additional reporting by Milo Milfort in Port-au-Prince. Edited by Andrew Gully.
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The New Humanitarian puts quality, independent journalism at the service of the millions of people affected by humanitarian crises around the world. Find out more at www.thenewhumanitarian.org.
