By Will Worley
A brutal and coercive regime is the main obstacle to an effective response to Myanmar’s earthquake disaster, say aid workers and human rights activists, pointing to uniquely complex conditions that necessitate working with some non-state armed groups.
Critics have long attacked the UN – and other international aid actors – for working only with the permission of the junta, delivering aid mainly within territory it controls. With the 28 March earthquake disaster crossing the front lines of the civil war, leaving millions affected on both sides, they argue that this is a golden opportunity to move away from what they see as an ineffective and morally questionable approach.
Since the outbreak of a full-scale civil war following a coup in 2021, Myanmar has morphed into a patchwork of territories. Some are under the rule of the military, but others are controlled by one of many armed groups that oppose the junta, which calls itself the State Administration Council (SAC).
UN relief operations – which involve complex logistics, and flying teams and equipment in and out of Yangon – all have to be run with the SAC’s approval, but the fragmented war has created numerous and shifting front lines, especially in the more remote and rural parts of the country. These have greatly complicated the humanitarian response to the earthquake disaster, which has claimed at least 3,800 lives and left more than 5,000 people with severe injuries.
“The earthquake is a rupture in a country that is having rupture after rupture. It poses new problems, but also just extenuates all existing problems,” Dustin Barter, senior research fellow at the ODI Global think tank, told The New Humanitarian. “There’s new attention, with the earthquake, to Myanmar: It ideally should encourage a shift in approaches.”
Despite the SAC’s claims to have implemented an earthquake-inspired ceasefire, the violence has continued, with airstrikes remaining routine: Earlier this week, a school was bombed by the military, reportedly killing 20 students and two teachers.
And the ordeal is not over: As the rainy season begins, some 6.3 million people remain in humanitarian need in the hardest-hit areas, including 200,000 displaced by the earthquakes. According to a 9 May update, the UNICEF-led team responsible for the water, sanitation, and hygiene response, known as the WASH Cluster, had only reached 23% of its target population.
As devastating as the earthquake itself was – shallow and, at 7.7 magnitude, the strongest to hit the region since 1912 – the humanitarian response to it was made harder by Myanmar’s highly sensitive and politicised aid context. It’s a country where many of the critical challenges facing humanitarians overlap: entrenched violence, complex politics, belligerent states, and declining faith in the international system.
These dynamics are also colliding with poor timing for the humanitarian sector: Myanmar represents one of the first high-profile disaster responses in a new era of extreme funding cuts from international donors, notably the United States.
Ethnic organisations pitched as humanitarian players
Myanmar had already seen decades of conflict since its independence from the UK in 1948, with a wide assortment of ethnic armed groups fighting for greater autonomy and shares of mineral wealth. But the 2021 coup sparked a new civil war, pitting the junta’s forces against a variety of old and new armed opposition groups.
This bitter political backdrop has seeped into the aid landscape, and divisions have deepened between international agencies, often perceived to cooperate with the junta, and the various Myanmar organisations and networks that are willing to work outside of SAC control, including with armed factions.
Since 2021, several longstanding Ethnic Armed Organisations, known as EAOs, have further consolidated their control of certain parts of Myanmar. They have also developed parallel governance structures, which has included caring for the many internally displaced people in their territories.
For example, the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC) was formed in 2023 as part of the Karenni Interim Government. It provides essential services and collects taxes, but it also provides humanitarian care to people displaced by the conflict and is associated with armed groups.
“We are the authority. We are authorised to look after our people,” Banya Kun Aung, secretary of the IEC, told The New Humanitarian. Despite being far from the epicentre, Karenni state was still affected by the 28 March earthquakes, suffering landslides, sinkholes, and damage to water infrastructure and buildings.
It is to groups like these – Karenni authorities were cited in particular – that some aid workers say beleaguered humanitarian efforts in Myanmar should turn. This echoes a stance popular among aid activists even before the earthquake, but observers say the disaster brings fresh urgency to reform aid efforts in the country.
“At this point in time, some of these non-state armed groups are our legitimate [international humanitarian] partners,” Manny Maung, a human rights researcher, said last month in a webinar run by the ODI think tank. “They have the will of the people, the support of the people; they are delivering services to the people; and we cannot be bogged down by the conventional ideation of what it means to work with a non-state armed group, because it’s not the same context in Myanmar.”
The fact that the three most powerful EAOs – the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – have all been accused of severe human rights abuses is not dampening enthusiasm for governance projects like the Karenni IEC.
Myanmar civil society figures have called the project a “blueprint for other liberated areas” that “donors must recognise and actively support” – a stance that is receiving support among international advocates. Their call is part of a broader revolutionary vision for a federalised democratic Myanmar, an objective pushed by the exiled National Unity Government (NUG), which also has a humanitarian department but did not respond to requests for comment.
Junta remains a major obstacle to relief
As Myanmar’s regime is typically isolationist and heavily reliant on a few key allies like Russia and China, General Min Aung Hlaing, leader of the SAC, made waves following the earthquake when he invited “any country or organisation to come and assist”.
Many international search and rescue teams did – from 32 countries, according to junta-controlled media – though their work was reportedly heavily controlled by SAC soldiers.
Also unusually, the SAC announced a ceasefire on 2 April, five days after the earthquake, later extended until 31 May. In reality, however, the war has not stopped, including for victims of the disaster.
The Centre for Ah Nyar Studies, a monitoring group, conducted an impact assessment in the worst-hit Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing townships. Published on 6 April, it interviewed 251 earthquake-affected people and found 32% of them had endured a military airstrike or raid following the disaster. Three different international monitors documented dozens of junta attacks in the days after the ceasefire.
While the junta has traded accusations the other way too, the opposition media now puts the number of attacks in the hundreds, and the ousted civilian government says the military has killed nearly 400 people within a month.
But it’s not just the SAC’s military attacks that have hindered the earthquake response.
Khin Ohmar, founder of Progressive Voice, a human rights advocacy group, said she heard reports of people responding to the earthquake being arrested and surveilled, and of security forces collecting information about who donated to some relief causes. Banyar Toee, president of the Centre for Ah Nyar Studies, said he received reports about aid materials being confiscated by the military.
Such allegations were echoed by the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas Andrews. In a 10 April statement, he said the SAC “continues to obstruct aid from reaching untold numbers of those in desperate need. This is making a terrible situation devastatingly worse.”
The military has long been accused of diverting and weaponising aid, particularly as conflict has intensified since 2021. Many aid workers and rights activists interviewed by The New Humanitarian also cited the military’s behaviour after Cyclone Nargis in 2008, which saw aid blocked and humanitarian workers jailed.
One Myanmar aid worker, who travelled for an international NGO through military checkpoints to Mandalay and Sagaing soon after the earthquakes, said – even if there were officially no restrictions – the presence of SAC security forces alone acted as a deterrent on where local civil society groups were willing to work.
Speaking anonymously for security reasons, the aid worker told The New Humanitarian that many Myanmar NGOs are unwilling to register with the SAC, as demanded by the junta, for fear of what might happen to them or of losing their freedom to operate.
Despite this, they are often asked to do so by the UN agencies and international NGOs they work with, Banyar said, “which is very, very risky for local civil society groups.”
“We said no [to the requests],” he added.
Most of the 15 million people in humanitarian need in Myanmar are in areas controlled by opposition armed groups, according to Banyar. “When we register, we are not allowed to do such things – we are not allowed to save lives in the resistance groups-controlled area,” he said. “We will only be allowed to do the things SAC wants us to do in a very, very narrow space.”
Myanmar watchers say the inverse of this – supine adherence to bureaucratic SAC requirements and restrictions – is exactly what has been fuelling widespread resentment and frustrations at the aid efforts of the UN and international NGOs.
Calls for a dual response
The fault line that struck Sagaing was political as well as geological: The area has become a stronghold of the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), the armed pro-democracy groups fighting the junta since 2021.
There are reported to be more than 300 intertwined PDF outfits operating in Magwe, Sagaing, and Mandalay, complicating access for international humanitarians trying to work with permission from SAC. Different armed ethnic groups hold sway over several other chunks of the country. The junta, meanwhile, controls most major cities and infrastructure, including Yangon airport, which is needed to fly in supplies.
Despite calls from the junta’s most vociferous opponents to never work with the military, including on humanitarian relief, some are cautiously suggesting a two-pronged aid approach could work best to help those affected by the earthquakes.
Myanmar expert David Scott Mathieson suggested that “instead of getting bogged down in debates over which system [with or without SAC] is better, accept that both have their merit and important functions to perform”.
To some extent, Ohmar of Progressive Voice agreed. “In [the earthquake-hit capital] Naypyidaw or in Mandalay city, the reality is [the SAC] are there, they are still controlling the structure,” she said. “The aid must reach the people with transparency, accountability, but also equal distribution. This is why we are very concerned: because of how [the SAC has] operated in the history of Myanmar in any disaster.” Ohmar suggested embassies present in Myanmar could “monitor and give that signal to the junta that ‘we are watching what you do with our money’.”
International agencies “need to work with the SAC to save lives”, said Banyar. “But on the condition that we do not empower the SAC to kill people, for example, by] giving cash aid directly to the SAC, which is very, very risky.”
“Working with the SAC or working with other entities in Burma, it is possible,” said Banya Kun Aung of the Karenni IEC, calling for a coordination platform to be created, and then for a free and fair humanitarian system to be designed by UN agencies together with a state entity that doesn’t control everything. He said more pressure was needed on the SAC “to allow the UN to work more freely on the ground… But some UN agencies are weak or afraid, I don’t know why.”
Covert progress on localised aid
After many years of complaints, international donors have been taking local aid groups more seriously, several of the Myanmar sources told The New Humanitarian, speaking as many did for this article, on condition of anonymity. Some said they had been contacted by international NGOs and government donors following the earthquake.
Despite some beliefs to the contrary, UN humanitarian chief Tom Fletcher, who heads the emergency aid coordination body, OCHA, told The New Humanitarian “yes” when asked if he had a chance to meet the NUG or any EAOs while in Myanmar after the disaster.
“In any humanitarian response, engagement with all parties to reach people in need of assistance is crucial – in line with this approach, Mr. Fletcher had discussions with all stakeholders during his visit,” an OCHA spokesperson later added.
The statement continued: “The UN distributes aid directly to affected communities through its network of humanitarian and development partners. Aid is not channelled through the State Administration Council, National Unity Government, or any other party to the conflict.”
OCHA’s statement was a marked contrast to the remarks from Andrews, the human rights envoy, who called for the UN Security Council to encourage humanitarian work with the NUG, ethnic resistance groups, and Myanmar civil society.
Okkar Shein, head of programming at the Gender Equality Network, a Myanmar-based NGO, said some flexible funding has been made available for local groups.
Advocacy for local humanitarians in Myanmar has seen successes, “to the point where [donors] got to understand that without the locals, [aid] cannot be delivered”, said Ohmar. But she estimated that the amount of aid coming in through informal channels was still fairly nominal – around $30 million per year compared to the $300 million channelled to Myanmar with junta approval, according to the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan.
She worried that the hard-won progress on funding local humanitarian responses could be undone by the earthquake, as more aid surges into the country through the military. Others, speaking anonymously, worried about the impact of USAID’s closure, as the agency was respected for its discreet work supporting informal humanitarian channels in Myanmar.
Despite many vocal advocates, who frequently call for outside-the-box thinking, exactly how donors can support Myanmar’s local aid networks while avoiding the SAC is a topic its supporters, including donors, are often reluctant to detail in public.
In practice, it means “providing support to civil society networks from neighbouring countries, especially Thailand, and [to a lesser extent] India,” said ODI’s Barter, adding that it often includes cash or medical supplies.
So-called cross-border aid – also used in Syria to circumvent the former al-Assad regime – has a long history in Myanmar, but it is contentious and can be risky as it contravenes the wishes of the central authority.
Big international aid agencies “will not refer to ‘border channelling’ or ‘cross-border’ because they operate within a ‘state sovereignty’ frame, but this does not work in the Myanmar context”, said Ohmar.
Donors who support it tend not to admit it publicly, for diplomatic and security reasons. Any Myanmar civil society or donor sources currently involved in these efforts declined to go into the details of how it works, citing security reasons.
Longstanding complaints about the performance of the UN in Myanmar have not abated, and local groups say there is a limited understanding of the organisation’s response or funding abilities following the earthquake.
Okkar’s organisation is normally funded by a UN agency, but was unable to access emergency funding following the earthquake: He was unsure why.
While the UN agencies have money, they “cannot disburse funding efficiently or immediately to local [civil society organisations] with very little resources when they are in need,” added Okkar. He approached another UN agency for emergency funding – for items like dignity kits, rehydration salts, and personal protective equipment – but was told the agency required an assessment to release the funding. Okkar said this would take around a month to complete.
“In that time of emergency, why do we need to take a lot of time to do that kind of assessment?” he asked. “They should skip the procedure… in an emergency, money first, resources first, and then we will do paperwork later.”
Edited by Andrew Gully.
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The New Humanitarian puts quality, independent journalism at the service of the millions of people affected by humanitarian crises around the world. Find out more at www.thenewhumanitarian.org.
