Colombia’s surge in armed violence: How did we get here?

COLOMBIA is in the midst of a dramatic surge in violence from armed conflict. Already this year, hundreds of people have been killed, tens of thousands trapped in their homes by fighting, and nearly 122,000 forcibly displaced. How did we get here?

Less than 10 years ago, a 2016 peace deal between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) laid out a roadmap for bringing an end to the country’s decades-long civil war. And in 2022, current President Gustavo Petro rode into office on the popularity of his promise to find ways of ending conflict with other armed groups through negotiations as part of his flagship Total Peace policy.

After an initial post-peace agreement lull, however, armed violence has stormed back. In the first three months of this year, the number of attacks on security forces and civilians, massacres, child recruitment by armed groups, forced displacement, and other violent incidents increased by 45% compared to the same period last year.

The surge is being driven by the fragmentation of armed groups who are competing over territory where lucrative drug production, drug smuggling, and illegal mining activities take place. Colombia is the world’s main supplier of cocaine, and production has reached record highs in the past few years.

While the profits to be made off the illicit trade are a major driver behind the violence, the instability and lawlessness underlying the spiralling situation have been decades in the making. Here is a breakdown of some key questions about how armed violence in Colombia got to this point:

What was the conflict between the Colombian government and the FARC?

The armed conflict in Colombia officially started in 1964 with the creation of leftist guerrilla groups, including the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Both claimed to be fighting for greater class equality in a country where the legacy of Spanish colonialism left a small elite owning most of the land and holding political power.

The FARC progressively became the largest armed group, both in terms of number of combatants and territory under its control, and entered into direct confrontations with Colombian state security forces and right-wing paramilitary groups. To finance its insurgency, the group turned to kidnappings, extortion, drug trafficking, and illegal mining activities. At its height in the early 2000s, the FARC counted between 15,000 and 20,000 fighters in its ranks.

According to Colombia’s Truth Commission, between 1985 and 2018, more than 450,000 people were killed in the multidimensional armed conflict by right-wing paramilitaries, the FARC, other armed groups, and state security forces. One of the darkest episodes of the civil war was the Colombian military’s extrajudicial killing of thousands of innocent people. The killings in what became known as the false positive scandal peaked between 2006 and 2008. They were carried out to artificially inflate the number of combatants killed to show progress in the fight against the FARC.

In 2012, after security forces decimated the FARC leadership, the armed group agreed to start negotiations with the government, resulting in the historic 2016 peace agreement. In the deal, the government agreed to establish ceasefires and lift arrest warrants for commanders in exchange for members of the FARC laying down their weapons. The agreement also aimed to address the root causes of violence and included policies to: reintegrate former combatants; introduce land reforms; initiate a transitional justice process; provide reparations to victims; and fight drug trafficking.

Monitoring mechanisms were established at both the local and international levels to oversee the implementation of the accords, and the international community has provided technical and financial support to the peace process. As of November 2024, however, only 34% of the commitments in the agreement had been implemented, while there had been minimal progress on 38%.

How did Colombia’s peace process fall off the rails?

The FARC wasn’t the only armed group in Colombia – although it was the largest. The 2016 peace deal brought hopes that other, smaller armed groups would follow the FARC’s example and disarm. However, they did not.

Instead, the lack of state institutions and resources in the areas most affected by the conflict allowed for a proliferation of armed groups and criminal organisations vying to fill the void left by the FARC.

Meanwhile, some ex-FARC fighters who laid down arms quickly became disillusioned and decided to resume fighting. A major issue has been a lack of protection for former guerrilla members: Between the signing of the peace deal and March 2025, 460 former fighters were killed by various non-state armed actors while trying to reintegrate into society.

Activists in communities affected by violence also voice criticisms of the Colombian government. “The implementation of the peace agreement has been in intensive care because there are no resources for the programmes created to implement it,” said Yolanda Perea, an Afro-Colombian social leader.

Federico Montes, a delegate from the commission set up to implement the 2016 accords, and a former FARC member who signed the peace agreement, told The New Humanitarian: “Each [government] has attempted to interpret the agreement in its own way, forgetting that it is an international accord that must be implemented comprehensively.”

How is the fragmentation of armed groups contributing to the current surge in violence?

The return to militancy by some former fighters has led to chaos within the FARC’s former forces. There are now at least three main dissident blocs that have splintered from the group due to opposition to the peace deal. These factions have clashed with each other, security forces, rival groups, and internally.

The Estado Mayor Central (EMC), the main FARC dissident bloc, is fighting with the second biggest bloc, the Segunda Marquetalia, over control of drug trafficking routes and other illicit activities in southern Colombia. They both include peace-signatory commanders who reneged and former FARC members who refused to sign the agreement from the beginning. Meanwhile, the smaller Middle Magdalena Bloc is predominantly active in the country’s northwestern Antioquia department.

These three main factions have further fragmented into yet smaller groups. In total, at least 29 new armed groups have formed since 2016.

To make things even more complicated, other major non-state armed actors such as the ELN, the country’s second oldest guerrilla movement, and the Clan del Golfo, the country’s largest drug cartel (also known as the Gaitanist Army of Colombia), are also fighting with FARC dissident blocs, with one another, and with internal factions.

All too often, the effects of violence between the seemingly ever-multiplying number of armed groups spill over into the lives of civilians living in the areas where they are fighting and attempting to take control.

How is the Colombian government responding?

President Petro’s promise to move away from military solutions to the spiralling conflict – which also often has negative impacts on civilians – was a major part of his appeal as a candidate. Once in office, he established a policy based on dialogue with armed groups, known as the Total Peace plan.

Petro managed to start negotiations with 22 armed groups simultaneously, including the ELN, five FARC splinter groups, and nine paramilitary and drug trafficking groups. But those negotiations have faced repeated setbacks, and most of them have now stalled due to confrontations across the country.

The lure of profits to be made off of illicit economies is the main reason why negotiations have broken down, according to Juana Valentina Cabezas, a researcher at the Institute of Studies for Development and Peace (Indepaz). “Total Peace questioned [the interests of armed groups] because it showed that their will to work towards peace is not as clear as [the violent] way they are acting,” Cabezas said.

The impact of the violence is particularly felt in poor, remote communities. Perea, the Afro-Colombian social leader, said: “While the central government talks about peace, communities in rural areas continue to be victims of the state’s lack of presence.”

Senator Iván Cepeda, who has worked as a key negotiator with armed groups, cautioned against being overly pessimistic, pointing to several successes of the peace process – from the reintegration of former fighters and initiation of justice and reparations initiatives to the implementation of land reforms and rural development projects.

“We must not lose sight of the fact that we are facing one of the longest-running armed conflicts in the contemporary world, with deeply rooted habits that are passed down from generation to generation,” he said. “That cannot be overcome overnight.”

Translated by Daniela Mohor. Edited by Andrew Gully and Eric Reidy.

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