By Patricia Huon
AFTER a rapid advance saw Rwanda-backed M23 rebels seize the two largest cities in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, uncertainty now looms over whether they will push on to the capital, and how much more the war will entangle the wider region.
The first direct peace talks between the rebels and the Congolese government were supposed to take place earlier this week in Angola, but M23 officials backed out citing new European sanctions against the group as undermining their participation.
DRC President Félix Tshisekedi then met his Rwandan counterpart in a surprise face-to-face encounter in Qatar on 18 March. All sides called for a ceasefire, but M23 representatives did not participate and have continued to grab more territory.
The rebels are now entrenching control over newly taken towns, setting up governance structures that signal plans for a long-term presence while expanding their territory far beyond that of any of the more than 100 other armed groups active in the east.
Civilians in towns threatened by the group’s advance say they fear their arrival as well as the presence of retreating Congolese soldiers and allied militias, who have been looting and committing human rights abuses in many areas.
“The situation is really bad here… the warehouses and the market have been looted, the schools and banks are closed,” said a Congolese worker at an international NGO in Uvira, a large eastern city which is south of Bukavu and in the M23’s crosshairs.
The aid worker, who asked not to be named, said armed men – likely allied to the DRC army – are increasingly present in Uvira and are committing grave abuses. “People have been killed in their homes without anyone knowing why or by whom,” he said.
The M23 is mostly led by Congolese Tutsi rebels who initially justified their insurgency by claiming that DRC failed to implement a prior peace deal with the group, and by arguing that Tutsi communities were being discriminated against.
The rebels descend from a long line of DRC armed groups backed by neighbouring Rwanda. Support began in the 1990s as Rwanda’s new Tutsi-led government hunted down Hutu extremists who fled to DRC after perpetrating the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Rwanda says genocidaire militia still poses a threat to its security, though it officially denies giving support to the M23.
The Congolese government responded to the latest insurgency, which began in 2021, by aligning with abusive militias while refusing to engage in peace talks – actions that fuelled M23 and Rwandan grievances and strengthened their justification for fighting.
Having taken big provincial capitals in recent weeks, the M23 has vowed to march on Kinshasa and is voicing increasingly national aspirations through a political wing, the Congo River Alliance (AFC), which wants to topple Tshisekedi.
However, analysts say the group’s Rwandan backers may be satisfied with limiting themselves to the east, establishing a buffer zone that secures their influence, grants access to valuable natural resources, and allows them to counter rival armed groups.
Regional countries involved in the conflict are determining how to respond to the latest escalation. Southern African (from South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania) and Burundian forces are scaling back support to the Congolese army, while Uganda – closer to the M23 – has expanded its presence.
The humanitarian situation is especially concerning for displaced people. Tens of thousands have escaped Bukavu and nearby areas for Burundi, while uprooted people who were living in Goma having fled an M23 offensive elsewhere are now returning to devastated areas.
“Families are extremely vulnerable; they are going back to nothing,” said Thierry Allafort-Duverger, head of emergency programmes in Goma for Médecins Sans Frontières. “Of course, people want to go back home, but will the assistance they need be able to reach them?”
This briefing takes stock of the current situation, examining developments in Goma and Bukavu since their fall, analysing the current motives of the M23 and Rwanda, the potential for a deeper regional conflict, and the prospects for peace.
Who are the M23 and what has happened since they seized Goma and Bukavu?
The rebels are named after a failed peace deal signed on 23 March 2009 between the DRC government and an M23 predecessor group, the CNDP. The M23 was formed when CNDP fighters accused the government of failing to respect the agreement.
The M23 led a defeated rebellion in DRC back in 2012 but was reactivated by Rwanda a decade later. Kigali denies supporting the group, but UN experts say thousands of Rwandan soldiers are in DRC and have de facto control over the rebels.
Rwandan support, combined with weaknesses in DRC’s army, enabled the M23 to seize vast amounts of territory in North Kivu province before capturing the provincial capital, Goma, a city of two million, in January: the conflict’s biggest escalation to date.
The rebels also captured Goma during their 2012 offensive but were only able to hold it for a few days. This time, however, they appear intent on staying and are appointing new authorities while organising mass rallies to assert their power.
The group has tried to project an image of normalcy since arriving in Goma, but its forces have allegedly carried out summary executions, threatened civil society activists, and pushed out displaced people who had sought refuge in the city over recent years.
Zebelize Tuyanbazi lived in a tent in an overcrowded camp north of Goma for two and a half years with her husband and seven children. She recently returned to her small town, about 40 kilometres away.
Back home, she found her wooden house partially destroyed by the fighting. “There is nothing left, everything has been stolen: the beds, the mattresses,” she said. “I have a field, but I cannot cultivate it without tools and without seeds.”
The rebels took over Bukavu – South Kivu’s capital and a city of around one million people – three weeks after capturing Goma, and have again attempted to project an image of stability, even organising a mandatory community street-cleaning initiative.
However, their actions in Bukavu have also been marked by abuses, including alleged summary executions of children. Their failure to maintain security was also highlighted by bomb blasts at an M23 rally that killed multiple people.
“Whoever is responsible [for the blasts], it shows that civilians continue to die and live in fear,” said a human rights activist in Bukavu. “We are talking about people that are already traumatised. They just want peace so they can feed their families”
The activist said many civil society members have left Goma and Bukavu or are in hiding. “Being too vocal or exposed is not the best thing to do at the moment,” they said. “There is also a communication war taking place. I don’t think criticism will be tolerated.”
What do the rebels want?
Rebel leaders have put forward various demands at different stages. They include: an amnesty for past violence; the integration of their fighters into the army; and the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees, some of whom have been displaced since the 1990s.
The group also regularly brings attention to the long-standing discrimination of Tutsi communities in DRC, though many feel that is a pretext for the insurgency since there was no documented increase in discrimination in the lead-up to the rebellion in 2021.
With the creation of the AFC, in December 2023, the M23 has been developing a more national agenda, with much of it articulated by AFC head Corneille Nangaa, the former president of the Congolese electoral commission.
“There is an intention to legitimise the rebellion, to give it a broader Congolese face beyond a specific community, with Nangaa and his close circle now clearly interested in national aims,” said Josaphat Musamba, a Congolese researcher.
Nangaa led the electoral commission during the contested 2018 election that put Tshisekedi in power (despite another candidate winning the vote). He is now leading an insurgency against the head of state he helped install.
Many of the political and communication advisors surrounding Nangaa were figures in the party of Joseph Kabila, who preceded Tshisekedi. This had led Tshisekedii to accuse Kabila of backing the AFC.
Nangaa and his allies frequently criticise Tshisekedi’s governance record, tapping into growing public discontent as the president has cracked down on opposition groups and attempted to amend the constitution to extend his rule.
In a sit-down interview with The New Humanitarian last month, Nangaa, who had swapped his military gear for civilian clothing, emphasised the group’s national ambitions.
“The objective is the liberation of our population against this corrupt regime,” said Nangaa, wearing a black zip-up jacket and a cap of the same colour, which bore the eagle logo of the AFC.
“The Balkanisation of Congo is not on our agenda, but in the meantime, the space where we are today has been liberated,” Nangaa said. He said these territories will be ruled “autonomously”, and that the takeover is not an “occupation” but a “revolution”.
For many Congolese, these words evoke a sense of déjà vu. In 1996, another Congolese rebel leader – backed by Rwanda and Uganda – launched a rebellion that marched to Kinshasa. That man was Laurent-Désiré Kabila (father of Joseph Kabila).
The army of then-president Mobutu Sese Seko – who had ruled DRC (it was called Zaïre at the time) for more than 30 years – crumbled as Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s rebel outfit, the AFDL, swept through the country.
Onesphore Sematumba, of the International Crisis Group (ICG), said the context today differs in that the international community was tired of Mobutu – and is less so with Tshisekedi. Still, he said, “the balance of power on the ground is not in [Tshisekedi’s] favour.”
For the moment, the likelihood of the rebel alliance taking over Kinshasa, some 1,000 miles to the west, seems slim. Whether the M23’s military leaders and their Rwandan backers have the same national vision as Nangaa is also unclear.
For now, the rebels are seizing new territory, capturing Walikale, a town in North Kivu, while travelling through South Kivu’s Hauts-Plateaux region, and eying up the major city of Kisangani, and the southeastern copper-mining heartland of Katanga.
The group has demonstrated its ability to quickly gain ground, and by seizing military equipment abandoned in recent weeks by the Congolese army and allied Romanian private military contractors, it has also significantly strengthened its capabilities.
What does Rwanda want?
Rwanda presents its interests in DRC as security-related, maintaining that its priority is to destroy the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a group founded in eastern DRC by Hutu extremists who perpetrated the 1994 genocide.
Kigali, which has been using the same justification for backing Congolese rebel movements since the 1990s, has criticised the Congolese army for collaborating with the FDLR, and for imperilling Tutsi communities.
Rwanda has legitimate concerns related to the FDLR – and the genocide remains deeply ingrained in Rwandan society – but most researchers agree that recent collaborations were initiated by the Congolese army to counter the M23, and were not the proximate trigger of the insurgency.
It is widely believed that Rwanda began backing the M23 to maintain influence in eastern DRC – an area it sees as its strategic backyard – amid growing competition from regional rivals, especially Uganda.
Historical claims have also been at play – Rwandan officials have long claimed that parts of eastern DRC were once Rwandan land, taken away during the colonial period – as are economic motives to exploit a mineral-rich region.
“There are multiple reasons for Rwanda’s involvement, among which are an expansionist aim and the access to resources,” said Laurent Munyandilikirwa, a Rwandan human rights lawyer who is living in exile.
Munyandilikirwa said he doesn’t believe in the security-related argument that Rwanda is putting forward around the FLDR, which is much less powerful than it used to be and rarely threatens Rwanda.
With the prospect of the M23 controlling the entirety of North Kivu and South Kivu, Rwanda could effectively be gaining an area several times its size. Still, analysts who spoke to The New Humanitarian said it is unlikely it will formally annex the region as this would be too blatant a violation of international law.
Instead, many think Kigali will be satisfied with installing a friendly administration under the M23/AFC that allows it to maintain a sphere of influence in eastern DRC, preserving both its economic as well as security interests.
Will international pressure and peace talks help?
International criticism of Rwanda had been limited since the M23 insurgency began, particularly among its largest Western donors. However, that has begun to change since the takeover of Goma.
In recent weeks, the US, the UK, Canada, Germany, Belgium, and the EU have all announced sanctions against M23 leaders and Rwandan officials and/or halted their aid to Kigali. Kagame has acted unbothered, but the pressure could still force his hand, Munyandilikirwa said.
“He knows that Rwanda needs development aid and cooperation,” the rights activist said. “This helps pay the salaries of civil servants and even the military. If funding stops, poverty will increase.”
Back in 2012, international pressure pushed Rwanda to sever ties with the M23, which eventually surrendered. However, the current context is different, with Rwanda having strengthened its influence both in Africa and on the international stage.
Seeking to resolve the conflict, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the East African Community (EAC) – DRC is a member of both – have intensified their engagements in recent weeks, without much success.
The AU has also mandated Angolan President João Lourenço to act as a mediator in the crisis, with Luanda announcing that direct talks between the two sides would take place this week.
However, the M23, after complaining bitterly that the DRC presidency was refusing negotiations, ultimately rejected the talks, citing “successive sanctions imposed on our members”.
Congolese political analyst Christian Moleka said Kinshasa has no choice but to accept negotiations with the M23, but suggested that some advisers around Tshisekedi don’t want talks. “The politicians in Kinshasa are very divided,” he said.
Moleka said the M23 are unlikely to accept previous arrangements that had been discussed by DRC and Rwanda as part of Angolan and EAC mediations. These included provisions for the rebel group to withdraw and canton its troops.
“They can’t be treated like any other armed group when they control big chunks of provinces,” Moleka told The New Humanitarian.
Sematumba of the ICG agreed that if direct talks do happen, Kinshasa will likely demand the withdrawal of the M23 and Rwandan troops, but neither will accept it “as they have the upper hand”.
Sematumba said the integration of the rebels into the Congolese army and other power-sharing arrangements will also be on the table, reflecting strategies used in past peace processes with Rwanda-backed rebellions.
“They never addressed the deeper issues, but I don’t see how they will avoid similar arrangements this time,” Sematumba said.
Will regional tensions worsen?
Many analysts have drawn comparisons between the current conflict and the Second Congo War (1998–2003), which involved numerous African countries. Yet the risks of a further regional escalation may be decreasing.
A SADC summit on 13 March ended the mandate of its military mission in DRC – SAMI-DRC – and ordered the start of a phased withdrawal of its troops from the country.
Burundi, which was providing key support to the Congolese army, has also withdrawn some of its troops from the front. The proximity of the fighting to the Burundian border risked leading to a direct confrontation between Burundi and Rwanda.
Uganda has been playing a more ambiguous role. In 2021, it deployed troops to help DRC fight the Allied Democratic Forces, a rebel group of Ugandan origins based in the east, and to construct roads that would boost trade between the countries.
Since then, however, UN experts have accused Kampala of supporting the M23, allowing it to use its territory as a rear base. Last month, Ugandan troops expanded their presence in northeastern Ituri province, which is close to M23-held areas.
Both Uganda and Rwanda use smuggled Congolese minerals to boost their exports. While not the primary cause of conflict, some armed groups, including the M23, also benefit from their extraction, as do international corporations, which reap vast profits as many Congolese remain in poverty.
Edited by Philip Kleinfeld.
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The New Humanitarian puts quality, independent journalism at the service of the millions of people affected by humanitarian crises around the world. Find out more at www.thenewhumanitarian.org.
